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failed to act. It is undisputed that Gilbert did not redeem the 
property in his name in 1947. The last deed of record prior to 
Gilbert's deed to himself and Maud in 1976 is the 1940 deed to 
Gilbert and Robert from Summit County. Gilbert and Maud admitted 
the existence of Robert's interest and contradicted their testi-
mony in the legal description portion of two 1976 deeds to 
themselves. (See Exhibits 9 and 11 - Deposition of Gilbert 
Kimball) The Court admits the facts upon which it bases the 
laches decision are assumptions in discussing Robert's failure to 
act: "If Robert believed . . . " clearly identifies this Court's 
opinion of Robert's failure as based on an assumption of notice 
and a failure to act. 
At the trial Maud Kimball and Gary Kimball fabricated the 
statements allegedly made by Robert; plainly, they committed 
perjury. 
Maud testified that she was personally present during the 
19 47 discussion and the opinion of the Court cites her statement 
as truthful. But in Maud's deposition she testified she was not 
personally present and did not hear the alleged statement. (Maud 
Kimball deposition p. 21f line 23). Maud committed perjury by 
testifying that she was present and heard the Robert's statement. 
She claimed knowledge of a tax sale that never occurred and 
Robert's alleged presence in the State was clearly rebutted when 
Elizabeth Kimball testified Robert did not travel to Utah during 
that period of time or in 1947. 
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Gary Kimball testified he heard and remembered a discussion 
in 1953 between his father and Robert. Gilbert Kimball testified 
the last discussion between he and Robert was the 1947 discussion 
and Elizabeth Kimball testified that Robert could not have been 
present in Park City in 1953 because he was not in the State of 
Utah that year. Gary Kimball fabricated the entire conversation 
in an attempt to further his own interests. 
Elizabeth Kimball testified that her husband was not even in 
the State of Utah (or Park City) during the years 1947 and 1953. 
Robert Kimball was not present in the State of Utah and could not 
have heard any statement by Gilbert, have made a statement to 
Gilbert or have been placed on notice by any verbal statement by 
Gilbert during either 1947 or 1953. There was no evidence of a 
tax redemption in Gilbert's name in 1947 and Robert could not be 
placed on notice by an event that never occurred, Gilbert and 
Maud admitted to Robert's interest in the 1976 deeds to them-
selves and Elizabeth Kimball clearly testified that Robert was 
not even in the State in 1947 or 1953. The finding of laches 
against the Robert Kimball interest in completely and totally 
unsupported by any factual basis on the record. 
B. ESTOPPEL 
The Court also finds that Robert Kimball's successors in 
interest are estopped to assert the property interest of Robert 
Kimball. The factual basis for the claim of estoppel apparently 
the disputed evidence of Robert's renouncement of interest and 
Gilbert's continued payment of property tax. There is no 
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evidence of any expenditure of time or money on the property with 
the exception of the payment of taxes, there is no evidence of 
any improvement to the property, there is no evidence of any act 
by Gilbert Kimball or his successors in interest which Gilbert 
Kimball would not otherwise have done. Gilbert Kimball and Maud 
Kimball testified that they purchased the property in Gilbert's 
name in 1947 and that the property no longer carried Robert's 
name after that time; there was no reason for Gilbert and Maud to 
rely on Robert's renouncement of interest. The opinion of 
the Court states that the Kimball's relied on Robert's renounce-
ment of interest. Why? Clearly, if Gilbert and Maud Kimball are 
telling the truth, there was no reason for them to rely on 
Robert's renouncement of interest in the property. They simply 
could rely upon the deed to themselves from the County after the 
purported tax sale. 
It has been the position of Elizabeth Kimball and Melvin 
Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher that Robert Kimball never renounced 
his interest or verbally surrendered his interest in the property 
to Gilbert Kimball. (The Statute of Frauds U.C.A. 25-5-1 (1953 
as amended) prevents unwritten surrenders of interests in real 
property.) The statements by Gilbert and Maud Kimball and Gary 
Kimball are pure fabrications. The repudiation of interest did 
not occur and by the Kimball's own testimony the repudiation of 
interest could not be detrimental to them because they believed, 
if we believe their testimony, that they purchased the property 
in Gilbert's name in 1947. 
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Gilbert and Maud Kimball testified that they received legal 
advice on how to proceed in the absence of a deed from Robert. 
Apparently Gilbert and Maud Kimball did not do what they were 
advised to do by their legal advisor because the property re-
mained in the name of Gilbert and Robert up to the present time. 
The testimony by Gilbert and Maud Kimball creates the fact that 
there could be no estoppel in this situation because they did not 
rely on Robert's statements or renouncement of interest and they 
did nothing based on Robert's purported statements which they 
would not have done in the absence of the purported statements. 
At the time of his deposition, Gilbert Kimball knew where 
Robert Kimball's widow lived in Salt Lake City. He testified in 
his deposition that he knew Robert had a son living in Salt Lake 
City. During Gilbert's deposition counsel for the Respondents 
pointed out to Gilbert that there was no deed or document placing 
title to the property in his name alone. Following that deposi-
tion , the Kimball's counsel executed an affidavit in support of a 
motion for publication for service of summons as he initiated the 
quiet title portion of the Kimball's claim. The Kimballs did not 
make an effort to find Elizabeth Kimball in Salt Lake City even 
though it was clear from the record that Robert Kimball's inter-
est has survived over time. The Kimballs clearly tried to not 
serve the successors in interest to Robert Kimball personally 
with process to put them on notice of the quiet title matter. 
The Kimballs committed perjury in an attempt to support laches 
and estoppel defenses to the successors in interest of Robert 
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Kimball, The opinion of the Court rewards this reprehensible 
conduct by awarding the entire property to Maud and Gary Kimball. 
C. PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT 
Prior to the purchase of Elizabeth Kimball's interest by 
Melvin and Peggy Fletcher, the pleadings in the case filed by 
former counsel pled a prescriptive easement arising in the 
Fletchers by virtue of the continued use and possession of the 
property adverse to Gilbert and Robert Kimball for a period of 
more than thirty years. 
It is essential for the Court to understand that the property 
purchased by Melvin and Peggy Fletcher from their predecessors in 
interest is separate but adjacent to the property previously 
owned by Roy Fletcher, Melvinfs father. The Kimball property 
adjoins the Roy Fletcher property at the rear and the separate 
Melvin Fletcher property at the rear. 
The opinion of the Court apparently defeats the prescriptive 
easement of Melvin Fletcher to use the Kimball property at the 
rear of his property for access to his home by relying on certain 
statements by Melvinfs brother and sister which apply only to the 
Roy Fletcher property and not to the Melvin Fletcher property. 
Both Juanita Fletcher Love and Marion Fletcher prepared written 
statements defining the extent of the permission their father Roy 
enjoyed to cross the Kimball property. Neither Marion Fletcher 
nor Juanita Fletcher Love ever claimed that Melvin Fletcher had 
or has permission to cross the Kimball property from the property 
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which he and Peggy Fletcher separately own as distinguished from 
the Roy Fletcher property• 
The Court's opinion misapprehends the facts with respect to 
the Fletcher's predecessors. Apparently the Court believes the 
Marion Fletcher and Juanita Fletcher Love statements are material. 
Mary Workman, not Roy Fletcher, is the predecessor of Melvin and 
Peggy Fletcher and therefore Roy's consent has no bearing on the 
adverse use by Melvin and Peggy. 
Until the conclusion of the trial below and the opinion of 
this Court, no party knew who owned the property to the rear of 
the Mel Fletcher home; the smaller 98 x 77 foot description was 
alleged to be controlling by the owners of the Sweeney Land 
Company and a large gap (30 feet) existed between the 98 x 77 
foot parcel and the parcel to the North purchased by Sweeney Land 
Company from the Silver King Mining Company. It was across this 
gap which Gilbert and Maud Kimball claimed in 1976 that Mel 
Fletcher continued to enjoy access to his home for over thirty 
years. The opinion of the Court now apparently assumes that Mel 
Fletcher had the permission of an unknown owner for a thirty year 
period of time and is foreclosed from asserting a prescriptive 
easement to the land on which his garage, outbuildings and 
driveway now rest. 
It is clear that the prescriptive easement enjoyed by Melvin 
Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher is a separate property interest 
having to do with a separate and distinct property from the 
property described by Marion Fletcher and Juanita Fletcher Love 
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in their statements to Gilbert Kimball. The statements regarding 
Roy Fletcher's consentual use of the Kimball property have no 
bearing on the nature of Mel and Peggy Fletcher's use of the 
property to the rear of their home which is not the home of Roy 
Fletcher. It is also clear that until a judicial finding was 
entered of the accuracy of the 1976 Kimball deed, all of the 
parties to this dispute understood that no clear record interest 
v/as vested in Gilbert or Maud Kimball with respect to the property 
between the 98 x 77 foot parcel and the parcel purchased by 
Sweeney Land Company from the Silver King Mines; approximately a 
30 foot gap existed between those two parcels and it is this 
property which Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher have used for 
access to their property and for their garage and other outbuild-
ings for more than thirty years. 
POINT II 
THE OPINION FAILS TO FOLLOW THE STANDARD FOR THE 
REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE TRIAL COURTS AS 
MANDATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Trial Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a Decree of Quiet Title and Partition as required by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Findings of Fact were based 
on the Trial Court's observations of the witnesses and a review 
of the documentary and testimentary evidence available to it. 
The opinion of the Court correctly states the Rule that 
Findings of Fact should not be set aside unless they are clearly 
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erroneous. The clearly erroneous standard requires that there be 
no evidence to support the Findings of Fact. 
In Acton vs. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, (Utah 1987) the Supreme 
Court of Utah provided the most comprehensive guidance concerning 
the requirements of the trial courts to enter Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. Differences of interpretation in the 
facts should be resolved in favor of the judgment of the trial 
court who had the opportunity to view the witnesses and their 
candor while on the witness stand. Here the main opinion exer-
cises a substitution of a judgment of the Appellate Court for the 
judgment of the trial court. Throughout the main opinion the 
Court assumes that the statements attributed to Robert W. Kimball 
were in fact made by Robert Kimball and were true. The Court 
overlooks the internal inconsistency of the testimony and the 
contradiction of the testimony by documentary evidence and 
testimony of Elizabeth Kimball. Where the evidence must be 
weighed by a finder of fact, deference should be given to the 
trial judge and the trial judge should be sustained. 
The main opinion fails to sustain the findings of the trial 
court where the evidence was contradictory, rebutted and in-
ternally inconsistent. 
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POINT III 
THE OPINION MISSTATES THE LAW OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The Statute of Frauds 25-5-1 (U.C.A. 1953, as amended) 
requires that no interest in land may be surrendered unless in 
writing. This rule is intended to prevent frauds being perpe-
trated on the public and the courts in the trial of matters 
involving real property. It is uncontroverted that there is no 
writing surrendering or transferring the interests of Robert W. 
Kimball to Gilbert or Maud Kimball. 
The only exception to the Statute of Frauds requirement that 
such matters be in writing is the principle of promissory estop-
pel as described in Monarco vs. LoGreco, 220 P.2d 737 (1950). In 
Monarco v LoGreco the Supreme Court of California enforced an 
orally created interest in land. In that case the Plaintiff had 
worked an entire lifetime on a farm as a result of a promise that 
the farm would be left to him by his stepparents. The enormous 
degree of harm to the Plaintiff was weighed against the interest 
of the State in requiring that all interests conveying land be in 
writing. This landmark case sets the standard for the creation 
of promissory estoppel and the principal ingredient is the 
detrimental reliance and conduct in furtherance in the reliance 
on an oral promise. 
In the present case there is no conduct in reliance of the 
nature demonstrated in Monarco v LoGreco. The conduct of Gilbert 
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and Maud Kimball demonstrates no change in the course of dealing 
of the parties. First of all, the oral represention must be 
uncontroverted. It must have been made and the parties must 
agree that it was made. Second, there must be reliance on the 
oral statement and, third, that reliance must result to the 
detriment of the party who has relied on the statement. In the 
present case it simply is not clear that an oral renouncement of 
the property interest of Robert W. Kimball ever occurred. In 
fact, the overwhelming weight of the evidence is that it did not 
occur. Maud and Gilbert Kimball did nothing to demonstrate 
reliance and the elements of promissory estoppel to establish an 
exception to the Statute of Frauds are not present. 
CONCLUSION 
This case clearly should be remanded to the Trial Court for 
entry of Findings of Fact sufficient to clarify the reasoning of 
the Court with respect to the application of the doctrines of 
laches and estoppel. The Trial Court should also be instructed 
to reconcile the oral finding of the Court with the written 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by making additional 
findings which further delineate the verdict of the Court. 
However, the Trial Court should not be directed to a pre-
determined result by this Court. 
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